Introduction
One enduring historical debate concerns whether the American Constitution was intended to be "classical." Richard Epstein has argued forcefully that the Constitution was created as a "classical liberal" document, but after a century and a half it was hijacked by "progressives."
1 I
believe that this characterization is historically mistaken. The Constitution as written was distinctively "pre-classical," and began to be interpreted more classically only during the 1830s and after.
the Patent, or Intellectual Property, Clause. 16 Additionally, all three clauses were interpreted to address the ways that governmental power over the economy should be allocated between the federal government and the individual states. For patent law, a century and a half of federal supremacy has obscured that fact.
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 17 was also relevant to economic development.
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, however, it applied only to the federal government and was concerned almost exclusively with the exercise of eminent domain power for such things as rights of way. Only in the 1870s courts interpreting state constitution takings clauses became much more involved in ensuring that state sanctioned economic development paid its full costs, even if eminent domain was not involved. 18 Historically, Supreme Court decisions interpreting both the Contract Clause and Patent Clause considered whether government created exclusive rights could be used to encourage development. States had the power to issue monopoly grants already during the Colonial Era, and neither the Articles of Confederation nor the Constitution ever took that power away. Under the Articles of Confederation, which were in force from 1781 until the Constitution was ratified in 1789, the federal government had no power to issue patents. The states retained that power and issued exclusive rights in corporate charters and for patented inventions more or less interchangeably. 19 Today we do not think of the exclusive right created by a patent and the exclusive franchise given to a railroad to operate between too points as having many similarities. But this was not always so.
From the Colonial period until the mid-nineteenth century American legislatures and courts conceived of the patent as an active tool of economic development. States in particular granted patents in anticipation that the grantee would actually develop some work of public improvement. This conception of the patent was distinctly "pre-classical" in the sense that it envisioned considerable state involvement in ensuring that granted patents were used in socially beneficial ways. In addition, state issued patents, but not federal patents, were issued to "promoters" --that is, to those who had not really invented anything new, but rather promised to install technology or infrastructure in a new place. 20 A few decades later a much more classical conception of the patent emerged, as a property right pure and simple. Questions about whether and how to employ a patent were lodged almost entirely with its owner, who at the high point of patent classicism even had the power to use patents to keep technology off the market --precisely contrary to what the original framers of the provision had in mind. 21 One important consequence of this change was that the link between patents and government involvement in economic development was broken. That development haunts patent law to this day, giving us formal patent doctrine that is largely indifferent to how patents affect economic progress in particular markets. Instead, patent lawyers and judges behave much more like old fashioned property lawyers, generally obsessed with validity of title or location of boundaries, but rarely engaging broader questions about the relationship between the patent system and economic growth. Beginning in the 1890s first the states and later federal law reacted against important elements of this patent classicism, mainly by imposing limits on patent licensing. But these negative provisions were intended to limit monopolistic power and abuse. They never succeeded in restoring the affirmative developmental obligations inherent in the original patent system.
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The Changing Conception of the American Patent
The earliest American patents for inventions were a far cry from the private property rights model that predominates today. Historically, the American colonies and later the states viewed the patent as an active policy tool for economic development. Just as the early American states viewed corporate charters as granting private entrepreneurs a special right or privilege to induce the creation of infrastructure, 23 the patent was an inducement to introduce useful technology. Under this model both corporate charters and initially patents were granted selectively to private developers who promised to furnish the State with something that would contribute economic growth or infrastructure.
Prior to the first federal Patent Act, patents were issued directly by colonial and later state legislatures. The legislative grant sometimes identified as the earliest American patent was issued by the colony of Massachusetts Bay in 1641, giving Samuel Winslow an exclusive right to use a certain process to make salt. The originator of the grant was the Massachusetts General Court, which was the colony's legislative body. 24 There is some evidence that Winslow initially planned to protect his process as a trade secret, but then agreed to disclose it in exchange for a 21 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 22 See discussion infra, text at notes __. 23 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 at 17-41 (1991).
24 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN HANDBOOK RELATING TO PATENTS, CAVEATS, DESIGNS, TRADEMARKS, ETC. 42 (rev. ed. 1908).
ten year exclusive right from the General Court. 25 The patent was conditioned on the patentee's actual establishment of saltworks employing the patented method within one year of issuance. In addition it expressly placed no limits on the ability of outsiders to import salt into the Colony.
At least a half dozen colonies issued patents prior to the revolution, although the number was relatively small. 26 After the Revolution the United States was governed for seven years (1781-1788) by the Articles of Confederation, which did not grant the federal government any power to issue patents. Just as corporate charters, patents were granted directly by state legislatures and almost always for the purpose of facilitating specific works of public improvement.
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The first federal Patent Act, enacted in 1790, required applicants to provide a written description, together with drafts or models distinguishing the applicant's invention from prior art. The applicant had to petition the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General, 28 who were required to examine the application and then at least two had to agree that the patent should issue. The statute provided almost nothing in the way of substantive or procedural review standards. This procedure proved to be extremely cumbersome, and only 57 patents issued under the Act. 29 The substantially revised 1793 Act simplified the process, eliminating substantive government review and requiring only registration by the applicant. While approval by the Secretary of State was required, review was limited to ensuring that the application was in good order. 30 The statute gave the Secretary no authority to examine prior art or assess the proposed invention based on novelty, usefulness, or any other factor outside of the application record. It also assessed treble damages for infringement, but apparently granted them only to patentees who had commercialized their invention or licensed it out. Damages were 25 BUGBEE, GENESIS, supra note 13 at 58. while the standard for patentability be high, actual administrative examination of patents be minimal, with questions of validity, including novelty, assessed mainly by the courts subsequent to patent issuance. 33 The result was that patentees lost as many as 75% of litigated cases.
34
That Jacksonian coalition of the 1820s and 1830s opened the door through which economic classicism entered American public policy and Constitutional thought.
35 Andrew
Jackson became the symbol for a diverse combination of social, economic, and religious outsiders, united mainly in their opposition to the insider Federalists and Whigs who had dominated national politics and business. 36 For them, both the liberal granting of exclusive privileges in corporate charters and the nearly unconstrained granting of patent rights were unacceptable. The Marshall Court's strong interpretation of the Contract Clause largely forbad the states from reneging on privileges contained in corporate grants. Jacksonians increasingly saw them as threatening to create a permanent class of economic elites, excluding everyone else. 37 The problem with federal patents, by contrast, is that the grants were egregiously excessive, inconsistent with the emergent classicism of the day that believed monopoly privileges should be highly exceptional. 
The Origins of Patent Exceptionalism
This opposition to exclusive privilege became an increasingly powerful theme in American public law through the balance of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth. One of its most enduring manifestations was the expansion of administrative agencies as an alternative to entrenched, conservative courts. 38 Two of its most important contributions were the general corporation acts of the 1830's, which entitled everyone who could meet statutory requirements to incorporate, typically under the oversight of the secretary of state. At the same time, however, the general incorporation acts took away most of the Corporation's special exclusive privileges. 39 Beginning with the 1836 Patent Act, a second contribution was an increasingly administrative patent system, with objectively defined criteria of invention but only minimal involvement of government economic policy making. 40 The champion of the 1836
Act, Jacksonian Senator John Ruggles of Maine, later became known as the "father of the Patent Office." 41 One of the federal government's early important uses of administrative process, first authorized by the Patent Act of 1836, was to limit the number of issued patents but in a way that was free of political influence. 42 The federal patent then evolved into a "property right" that applicants could obtain through an administrative procedure intended to be politically neutral, and that patentees could practice or not at their will.
As noted previously, pre-classical theories of economic development relied heavily on exclusive rights in order to create incentives. Patents were a special case of this general principle. For example, the patent provision contained in the original English Statute of Monopolies in 1623 was nothing more than an exception to a statute that limited the government's power to grant monopoly franchises. 43 During the Jackson era the patent gradually became rebranded as a set of "property" rights, which entailed two things. First was a more ministerial set of rules for determining when patents should be issued, effectively removing this power from direct, individual legislative action. Chief among these rules was the limitation of patents to "inventors," plus a set of criteria for defining inventorship. 45 Second was the emerging idea that patents-as-property have the same protections that apply to rights in land or other traditional property. An important corollary was that, once they were issued, patents were subject to the management of their owners but relatively free from other federal control. The decision whether or not to make productive use of the innovation represented in a patent became purely private, emulating the law of real property. One cannot lose title simply through nonuse, and patent ownership creates no "social" obligations. Licensing and most other post-issuance practices were regulated, if at all, under state contract and commercial law.
With this change in legal profile, the American patent largely managed to escape most of the hostility toward monopoly and abhorrence of regulation that gradually increased after the Civil War and throughout the century. Most of that hostility was directed at state legislative grants or private business, but not at federal patent grants. The success of this transformation is underscored by the fact that the early twentieth century represented both the height of substantive due process doctrine, with its exaggerated fears of state created monopoly, 46 Paper Bag (1908) , 48 written during the heyday of Lochner-style hostility toward state created monopoly, permitted cartelization of patented products and allowed patentees to enforce unused patents in such a way as to keep technology off the market rather than facilitate its development.
In the process, patent law became much more privatized and divorced from government policy toward economic development. While such concerns were still articulated, they were increasingly relegated to boilerplate. The government's job was increasingly seen as limited to defining patent property rights, with questions about development and use left entirely to the private owner. As a result the patent system evolved into a remarkably different enterprise from, say, antitrust law, which even in litigation devotes considerable empirical resources to identifying and distinguishing the effects of particular practices in the markets where they occur. 49 The main reason this is true is that antitrust never turned into a property rights system, but rather gleaned its sources from economics as well as the common law of contracts and torts. For better or worse, it remained much more responsive to policy making about growth and development.
Federal Exclusivity
An essential part of the development outlined above was the rise of federal patent exclusivity --a result that was not mandated by the text of the Constitution's IP Clause. this Court specifically dealing with the question." Nor was there any federal statute on point.
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The Supreme Court responded by creating exclusivity de facto, on grounds of public policy, relying on the need for federal uniformity and not even mentioning the Tenth Amendment.
While drafting the first Patent Act in 1790 members of Congress vigorously debated whether federal patents could be given to mere importers of foreign technology, with a consensus emerging that such a provision exceeded Congressional power under the IP clause. 53 States, however, retained the power to offer other types of exclusive rights. These were given mainly in corporate charters, and often to entrepreneurs who had not actually invented anything but rather who promised to deploy technology that had been developed elsewhere.
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Classical Patent Law
Mid-nineteenth century changes in the legal concept of the patent moved away from an "involved" government toward the view that private action would achieve optimal development, provided that the issuance process was kept free of capture and contract and property rights were protected. The federal process of patent issuance became increasingly administrative, restricted to true inventors as determined by objective, nonpolitical criteria. In the process the patent began to change from an express element of economic development into a property right, pure and simple.
The Patent in Classical Political Economy
Beginning with Adam Smith, classical political economists and other policy writers became highly critical of the general system of encouraging development through the creation of monopoly rights. They believed that capital would gravitate naturally to investments that were destined to be profitable, and special state inducements were unnecessary. 55 Second, they complained repeatedly that, whatever the ideal vision of statecraft inherent in this process, it always resulted in excessive largesse to favored interested groups. corporate charters and patents were given to those who were politically well placed, and those not so favored were left to labor in the more competitive markets that remained.
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Patents managed to find a small place in the writings of classical political economists, provided their scope was sufficiently constrained and the granting process free from special interest control. For example, Adam Smith acknowledged the value of patents, but not with much enthusiasm. His Lectures on Jurisprudence, written about fifteen years before The Wealth of Nations, found exclusive rights generally to be "greatly prejudicial to society." 57 However, he found the British 14 year exclusive right for patented inventions to be "harmless enough." 58 The
Wealth of Nations itself says very little on the subject of patents, other than Smith's repeated objections to exclusive rights. 59 Smith also observed that "pecuniary rewards" such as bounties for valuable inventions were a way to encourage innovation, but in practice they would require the state to place a value on them, and this would "hardly ever be so precisely proportioned to the merit of the invention." 60 By contrast, exclusivity for a limited term plus the right to license would create rewards based on market evaluation.
Smith's denigration of patents might seem surprising, given the broad scope of The Wealth of Nations, which covered what we would today call both macro-and microeconomic topics, and with a strong focus on trade and commerce. Further, Smith's writing coincided with the start of the English Industrial Revolution, which began in the 1760s and spread to 56 Id. at __. 57 ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (undated, but delivered between 1762 and 1766), p. 115, annotated online edition, available at www.estig.ipbeja.pt/~ac_direito/Smith_0141.06.pdf. 58 Ibid. The greatest part however of exclusive priviledges are the creatures of the civil constitutions of the country. The greatest part of these are greatly prejudicial to society. Some indeed are harmless enough. Thus the inventor of a new machine or any other invention has the exclusive priviledge of making and vending that invention for the space of 14 years by the law of this country, as a reward for his ingenuity, and it is probable that this is as equall an one as could be fallen upon. For if the legislature should appoint pecuniary rewards for the inventors of new machines, etc., they would hardly ever be so precisely proportiond to the merit of the invention as this is. Continental Europe and America. 61 Smith certainly did not see a strong link between the industrial revolution and any protection that the British patent system had to offer.
Thomas Jefferson's position on patents was not that far from Smith's. Jefferson was one of the relatively few founding fathers who studied Smith closely in the late eighteenth century, although he was probably more interested by other writers in the Scottish classical economic tradition, such as Francis Hutcheson. 62 He shared Smith's views about the need for a small, relatively uninvolved state and had the same preferences for an agrarian rather than industrial society. Like Smith and Hutcheson, Jefferson was unenthusiastic about patents but willing to tolerate them provided that they were not excessively granted.
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Classical political economy began to take serious hold in the United States in the 1830s.
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American political economists in the classical tradition, such as Brown University's Francis Wayland, did not move far from Smith's position on patents. Wayland simultaneously railed against the evils of exclusive grants generally, but made a limited exception for exclusive rights for limited times for patents and copyrights. 65 By and large, however, these were passing observations, and there was little sustained discussion of patent rights. Indeed, one striking feature of Anglo-American economics generally is the small amount of attention devoted to the patent system until the early decades of the twentieth century. After 1830 both Congress and American judges attempted to forge a patent system that simultaneously rejected the pre-classical idea that monopoly was a useful general tool for encouraging enterprise, but also embraced a narrow and increasingly technical exception for inventors. They did this, first, by seeking to ensure that patent grants were limited to true inventions and not granted too liberally. Second, they reconceptualized the issued patent as a property right, similar to land grants, which entered the stream of commerce once they were created but thereafter received little government oversight other than protection of title and boundaries. Further, they were purely "private" in the sense that ownership did not require use or any other sharing with the public. These changes also served to remove the patent system from the stigma of state-created monopoly.
Smith was just as critical of business corporations as he was of the patent system. He opposed large aggregations of private power and believed that corporations ("joint stock companies"), as managers of "other people's money," were doomed to inefficiency and abuse. 67 Thomas Jefferson shared many of these views, which he derived from Smith, and strongly favored a nation of small farmers and yoemen.
68 By contrast, the classical statecraft that emerged in the United States in the 1830s under Andrew Jackson's administration was much more entrepreneurial. Rather than abolishing the business corporation, the Jacksonian states democratized it by making the business corporate form available to everyone as a matter of administrative law, and attempting to remove any hint of special privilege or monopoly right.
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Thus both the federal patent system and state corporate law developed administrative systems for awarding rights.
State v. Federal Patenting Power: Promoters vs. Inventors
The Constitution's Patent Clause gives Congress the power to issue patents but says nothing about whether that power is exclusive. Further, the Tenth Amendment provides that the states retain any power not granted to Congress. 70 The patenting power in the federal Constitution is also expressly restricted to "inventors" and only for "discoveries. By contrast, pre-classical theories of economic growth were much more focused on "developers," or entrepreneurs. What was important was not so much who had invented something, but rather who promised to deploy it to public advantage. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries states frequently granted patents and monopoly charters to firms that had not invented anything but rather had promised to build something with existing technology, such as a bridge or a steamboat line. Historically, if a grantee failed to construct or operate the thing contemplated by the grant, the legislative body could withdraw it. Today, by contrast, a patent is valid and enforceable, at least by damage actions, even if the patentee never puts the patent into practice.
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In addition, the right to exclude in a patent is specific to a technology described in the patent. By contrast, a monopoly right in a corporate charter was typically geographic, such as giving a private corporation the exclusive right to maintain a toll bridge for a specified distance in either direction. 75 The scope of invention or technology was not an issue. For example, some early decisions considered such questions as whether the exclusive right to operate a toll bridge over a river at a certain point served to exclude those who crossed over the frozen ice in winter by either walking or driving a sleigh. 76 The issue was not infringement of any technology embodied in the bridge, but simply crossing the river by any means within the proscribed distance. State-granted patents often combined these technological and geographic limitations without distinguishing them. By tying federal patent exclusively to inventors, the U.S. Constitution effectively divided the territory of government-sanctioned exclusive rights. Granting of exclusive rights in corporate charters remained largely a function of the states. Gradually, however, the power to grant exclusive rights for inventions was seen as a federal prerogative. As late as the 1830s judges argued that, while federal power to recognize true invention was exclusive, the power to grant exclusive rights to developers and promoters continued to reside with the states. In his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution, Joseph Story argued that while the Congressional power to grant patents was limited to inventors, the states retained the power to grant an exclusive right to "the possessor or introducer of an art or invention, who does not claim to be an inventor, but has merely introduced it from abroad . . . ."
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State-Issued Patents
After the Revolution but prior to ratification of the Constitution, patents were issued exclusively by individual states, and only by legislative enactment. John Fitch's first steamboat patent, probably the best known of post-Revolutionary state patents, was created by a special legislative grant from the state of New York. The patent was issued in 1787, when the states were still being governed by the Articles of Confederation. The patent granted "the sole and exclusive right and privilege of making and using boats, propelled by fire or steam, within the waters of New York State." 84 Id. at § 3, staging that the applicant:
shall deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or process or compounding the same, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science ... to make, compound, and use the same. 85 Id., § 7. That on the 19th of March, 1787, the legislature of the state of New-York passed an act . . . that the said John Fitch, his heirs, administrators and assigns, should be, and they were thereby vested The scope of the Fitch grant, covering all "boats propelled by fire or steam," was much broader than anything Fitch had actually invented. 88 At the time he had nothing more than some drawings. Nevertheless, the New York court sustained the patent against a claim that "[t]he grant in question is not of the exclusive right of a propelling power applied to machinery of an ascertained construction; but is a grant of the propelling power at large, wherever it is possible to create it on the waters of the state, if applied to the purpose of navigating vessels."
89
States continued to issue patents after the United States Constitution was ratified. In 1798 New York gave Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton a second patent to make and operate steamboats for up to thirty years. 90 Just as the Fitch patent, the Livingston/Fulton patent was a The steamboat patent history makes clear that the New York legislature was much less interested in rewarding inventors than in using monopoly grants to promote economic development. It wanted a set of working commercial steamboat lines. First, as part of his application to the legislature, Fitch was required to demonstrate the "great immediate utility and the important advantages" that would result from his invention. This included a lengthy description of the social benefits that would accrue, particularly in western watercourses that had been difficult to navigate. 95 Further, his patent was regarded as a legal commitment to deploy.
Unfortunately, Fitch never developed the promised steamboat or routes.
Several 
102(a)(1).
99 Livingston, 9 Johns at 509-10. deploy" rather than an "invention" in the modern sense. It was a product of intense bargaining with the legislature, which wanted steamboats of a specified capability to be deployed on New York waters.
One of the reasons that both Justices Yates and Kent gave for upholding the state's power to issue the patent was that the federal Constitution's Patent Clause gave Congress the power to issue patents only to "authors and inventors." 101 They also noted that the Tenth Amendment mandated that anything not expressly given to Congress was reserved to the states. 102 From that 101 Id. at 515.
102 Kent's statement is worth quoting.
If the grant is not inconsistent with the power of congress to regulate commerce, there is as little pretence to hold it repugnant to the power to grant patents. That power only secures, for a limited time, to authors and inventors the exclusive privilege to their writings and discoveries; and as it is not granted, by exclusive words, to the United States, nor prohibited to the individual states, it is a concurrent power which may be exercised by the states, in a variety of cases, without any infringement of the congressional power. A state cannot take away from an individual his patent right, and render it common to all the citizens. This would contravene the act of congress, and would be, therefore, unlawful. But if an author or inventor, instead of resorting to the act of congress, should apply to the legislature of this state for an exclusive right to his production, I see nothing to hinder the state from granting it, and the operation of the grant would, of course, be confined to the limits of this state. Within our own jurisdiction, it would be complete and perfect.... Congress may secure, for a limited time, an exclusive right throughout the union; but there is nothing in the constitution to take away from the states the power to enlarge the privilege within their respective jurisdictions. The states are not entirely devested of their original sovereignty over the subject matter; and whatever power has not been clearly granted to the union, remains with them.
Chancellor Kent also added this:
The power of congress is only to ascertain and define the right of property; it does not extend to regulating the use of it. That must be exclusively of local cognisance. If the author's book or print contains matter injurious to the public morals or peace, or if the inventor's machine or other production will have a pernicious effect upon the public health or safety, no doubt a competent authority remains with the states to restrain the use of the patent right. That species of property must likewise be subject to taxation, and to the payment of debts, as other personal property. The national power will be fully satisfied, if the property created by patent be, for the given time, enjoyed and used exclusively, so faras under the policy of the several states the property shall be deemed fit for toleration and use. There is no need of giving this power any broader construction in order to attain the end for which it was granted, which was to reward the beneficent efforts of genius, and to encourage the useful arts.
it followed that a state had the power to grant a patent right to someone who was not an inventor but rather a developer or promoter. Speaking of the federal Patent Act, which by this time was more than twenty years old, Justice Yates observed that under it patent applicants are limited to authors and inventors only; this clause, therefore, never can admit of so extensive a construction, as to prohibit the respective states from exercising the power of securing to persons introducing useful inventions (without being the authors or inventors) the exclusive benefit of such inventions, for a limited time. . . .
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Chancellor Kent agreed, stating the dominant pre-classical view about monopoly grants and economic development:
[T]he uniform opinion, in England, both before and since the statute of James, 104 non-inventing promoters, although its authority to do so --apparently under the Commerce Clause --was "not without a question."
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Economic Development and Unworked Patents
Like the monopoly grants created in state issued corporate charters, early patent provisions contemplated actual production under the exclusive rights that they permitted. Their purpose was to encourage development, not simply to create exclusive rights over technology. The patent grant in the Statute of Monopolies conferred the exclusive right on "manufactures," while the Massachusetts Bodie of Liberties limited exclusive privileges to "Inventions that are profitable to the Country…." Further, the term "invention," typically used together with the term "discovery," generally referred to the introduction of a new industry into the territory. That is, the emphasis was on developing a new industry in a particular area rather than developing a technology not previously known.
108 By contrast, the emergent classical conception of the patent saw it as a narrowly authorized property right, given only to inventors and thereafter placed more or less completely under the patent owner's control.
Many English patents from prior to the American revolution had "working clauses," later called "revocation clauses," which were provisions that required the patentee to commercialize the technology covered by the invention.
109 Some patents specified a number of years during which the patentee must perfect the invention or put it into use. Otherwise the patent would lapse or be revoked. Some patent systems retained working clauses until well into the twentieth century. 110 Obligations to practice, or "work," the patent were also included in many state patent grants during the early national period. Working clauses were a way of guaranteeing that the public would benefit from the grant of an exclusive right prior to the patent's expiration. If the patentee did not work the patent, then during the period covered by the grant no one else could do so either. The effective impact of such a patent would be to withdraw its technology or manufacture from service --precisely the opposite of what was intended. The effect was to put the patent "to sleep," in the words of economist John Maurice Clark.
114 Eventually working clauses gave way to requirements of disclosure and enablement, which required a patent to be sufficiently clear that another person who read it could replicate the invention without undue experimentation. 115 The importance of the difference should not be lost, however. Patent disclosure and enablement were intended to facilitate copying of the innovation by others after the patent expired. Nonuse during the patent period could still result in removal of the technology from the market during the patent's life.
Depending on available remedies, an unused patent manifested not merely the patentee's failure to develop, but also a right to prevent others from developing until the patent expired. In the early nineteenth century United States, a nation acutely aware of its undeveloped state, that idea was intolerable. Chancellor Kent concluded in his Commentaries that, while the government could not invalidate a United States patent simply because it was not being used, the owner could not maintain an action against an infringer.
116
In Earle v. Sawyer, written just as the steamboat patent wars were winding up, Justice Story also stated his belief that federal law required patents to be practiced before they could be enforced, concluding that the federal patent act protected "not a mere elementary principle, or intellectual discovery, but a principle put in practice.. The principal nineteenth century patent law treatise writers were not entirely consistent on the issue, although overall they favored a practice requirement. Willard Phillips, the most prominent patent law writer of the 1830s, insisted that reduction to practice was a prerequisite to enforcement. "The subject of a patent must be something that has been reduced to practice..; it must be something which has been actually done or produced," Phillips concluded in 1837, citing several British decisions as well as Justice Story's Earle decision. Further, "[t]he patent being for an invention that is described in it, it is not only requisite that the invention should be reduced to practice, but it must be reduced to practice in the way, and produce the effect specified." 120 George Ticknor Curtis, whose 1849 treatise was probably the most prominent in nineteenth century American patent law, did not disagree with Phillips. 121 However, his third edition, which was published in 1867, began to merge the practice requirement with enablement, or the idea of "constructive" reduction to practice:
It is not necessary that the invention should have been reduced to practice; but unless the description would enable the public, without further invention, to put the thing in practice, it cannot be said that a knowledge of that thing is in the possession of the public.
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In his 1890 treatise William Callyhan Robinson strongly disagreed, declaring that patent law required "nothing less than the actual practice or some art, or the construction of some article of manufacture."
123 Robinson expressly rejected the view that a detailed written description sufficient to enable someone to make the invention was sufficient. Indeed, for Robinson even a "model exhibiting the article in all its parts" was insufficient. But Robinson was swimming upstream. Already in 1872 one federal court had concluded that a legal rule voiding unworked patents was "wholly unsound" because "no such condition is required by the act of congress." 125 The idea of "constructive" reduction to practice began appearing in the case law --that is, that a patent should be treated as constructively reduced to practice if its disclosure was specified sufficiently that a knowledgeable person skilled in the art could implement the invention without excessive experimentation.
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The culmination of classical patent law was that an issued patent was a property right completely in the control of its owner, who should be free to use it or not at will and also to enjoin infringers. The Supreme Court embraced this view early in the twentieth century, in two decisions concerning the uses of patents in ways that served to limit rather than expand output. In Bement v. National Harrow the Supreme Court upheld a patent cross-licensing agreement that included a provision fixing the sales price of agricultural harrows covered by the patents. In response to the argument that product price fixing was not in the public interest Justice Peckham replied that the patentee's "title is exclusive, and so clearly within the constitutional provisions in respect of private property that he is neither bound to use his discovery himself nor permit others to use it."
127 With that, the Court reasoned that an owner who had the right not to use a property interest at all also had the right to fix the price at which the patented article could be sold.
Six years later in the Paper Bag case it went further, concluding that an unpracticed patent was both enforceable and that it entitled the patentee to an injunction against a competing firm. 128 The patent owner was a dominant manufacturer of paper grocery bags. It was using one type of cutter to make its bags, but purchased a patent on a different type of cutter from an outside inventor. Preferring to stick with its existing technology, the patent owner then brought suit against a rival firm whose technology resembled that in the acquired but unused patent. Not only did the Supreme Court permit the plaintiff to get an injunction shutting down the rival's technology, but it did so under a particularly broad reading of patent law's doctrine of equivalents, which permits infringement claims against technology that do not literally infringe a patent.
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Even more than Bement, the Paper Bag decision showed how dominant the private conception of patent law as a property right had become. The federal district court observed that the patent owner "stands in the common class of manufacturers who accumulate patents merely for the purpose of protecting their general industries and shutting out competitors." 130 Nevertheless, it felt obliged to issue the injunction. The First Circuit affirmed, but Judge Aldrich wrote a strong dissent complaining that in this case "a court of equity is asked not to protect from infringement the statutorily intended monopoly ... but to protect a monopoly beyond and broader...." Further,
The proposition involves the idea of a secondary monopoly maintained to stifle patent competition in the trades and industries, and thus contemplates a condition which at once contravenes the manifest purpose of the Constitution, and a monopoly of a kind and breadth and for a purpose in no sense ever contemplated by the statutory contract which safeguards the legal right to make, use, and vend under a particular patent.
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Nevertheless the Supreme Court concluded:
The inventor is one who has discovered something of value. It is his absolute property. He may withhold the knowledge of it from the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages and benefits which the statute promises to him who discloses to the public his invention.
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Over the subsequent four decades Congress was repeatedly asked to overrule or limit the effect of Paper Bag, mainly by providing for either forfeiture 133 Paper Bag represents the high point in the Supreme Court's development of patent doctrine based on private property principles, largely indifferent to concerns about economic development and growth. Under the law of real property the owner of undeveloped land has no duty to sell it to another for development, and she can use an injunction to exclude outsiders, no matter how socially beneficial their purpose. 135 This was so notwithstanding that no federal patent act ever made injunctions automatic. Rather they provided that such suits should be governed by general equitable principles. 136 While the principles were not fully stated in the Acts, commonly accepted requirements were that a remedy at law, or damages, was inadequate. Further, the plaintiff had to show that the public interest would not be disserved by an injunction. 137 Reflecting deep division in thinking about patents as absolute property rights or as tools of economic development, the courts initially divided on the question of entitlement to an injunction. Some concluded that the remedy for infringement actions on unpracticed patents should not be an injunction, which would keep the technology off the market altogether, 138 while others disagreed. 139 By approving an injunction restraining infringement of the defendant's unpracticed patent, the Paper Bag decision settled that issue for the time being.
Patents and Special Interest Capture: The First Sale Doctrine and Substantive Due Process
In Bloomer v. McQuewan, Chief Justice Taney wrote the Supreme Court's opinion limiting the enforcement of patent rights against someone who had previously purchased a patented product. In the process the Court implicitly tied patent doctrine to Jacksonian concerns about retroactivity and Contract Clause doctrine. 140 Bloomer was the Court's first statement of patent law's judge-made "first sale" doctrine and also its first declaration of what later became economic substantive due process.
141
Bloomer had licensed a patent on a rotary wood planing machine from its inventor, William Woodworth, one of the nineteenth century's most litigious patentees. 142 The machine's ability to smooth all four sides of a wooden board without pulling it to one side or the other as it passed through the machine made it a significant contribution to that industry. 143 Bloomer authorized others to build the machine with a license that limited the number of machines that could be built and their location, as well as the owner's ability to transfer the machines to others. 144 McQuewan's license authorized him to construct and use the machines in Pittsburg and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
145
As the patent approached expiration Woodworth, whose very substantial royalties were based on the square feet of surface area that went through the machine, lobbied Congress for retroactive extension of the patent term. Congress responded twice, first with a provision in the 1836 Patent Act extending the patent term and making the extension retroactive to cover patents that had already been issued. 146 McQuewan had acquiered the machines in question under the sublicense from Bloomer and paid royalties until the original patent's expiration. After the term was extended Bloomer insisted on reviving the royalties and sued for infringement when McQuewan refused to pay. To a Jacksonian the retroactive and single-owner term extensions represented the worst form of legislative capture, recalling all of the evils of the monopoly bridge franchises and the resulting changes in Contract Clause doctrine. 151 Chief Justice Taney's opinion for the Court rejected
Bloomer's infringement claim. The judge-made "first sale" doctrine that the Court developed, however, was much broader than needed for the purpose at hand. The Court held that "when the machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly.... The machine becomes his private individual property." 152 That rule, which survives to this day, 153 does not depend on the lawfulness of any legislative term extension. It can apply to a patented article at any time. Its effect has been to limit the restrictions that patentees can place on technology after a patented product has been sold.
The patent first sale, or "exhaustion," doctrine is a judge made rule that is intended to limit the scope of the patent "monopoly" in an area where both the Constitution's Patent Clause and the Patent Act are silent. 154 Chief Justice Taney was also concerned that retroactive patent extensions could serve to withdraw a property right from someone who had already purchased the patented good in the reasonable expectation that license restrictions would end when the patent expired. Here, in one of his most prescient and important utterances, he invoked the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, very likely because the Contract Clause was not available in an action involving a federally-created right:
The right to construct and use these planing machines, had been purchased and paid for without any limitation as to the time for which they were to be used. They were the property of the respondents. Their only value consists in their use. And a special act of Congress, passed afterwards, depriving the appellees of the right to use them, certainly could not be regarded as due process of law.
155
While Congress had the power to grant patents, it did not have the authority "to reinvest in [the patent holder] rights of property which he had before conveyed for a valuable and fair consideration."
156 Taney recited a parade of horribles under which innocent purchasers might acquire goods that are out of patent, but that patent rights could then spring up as a result of a retroactive Congressional term extension and limit their usefulness or require payment of a royalty.
157
In anticipating substantive due process doctrine, Taney's discussion reflects a deep suspicion of legislative capture and of the threat to settled expectations in property rights. He might have added that a retroactive term extension such as the Woodwards obtained from Congress did not serve to incentivize anything, for this patent had already been issued.
Although Taney cited "due process" as the rationale for his decision, the facts of Bloomer actually come much closer to the core concerns of Contract Clause doctrine than to what became economic substantive due process. The disanalogy was that the challenged term extensions came from the federal government rather than a state. Bloomer's principal concern was retroactive legislation that undermined settled expectations in a sale of property that had already occurred. That was consistent with the Contract Clause, which also barred the states from making ex post facto laws. 158 Further, the retroactive term extension represented precisely the type of special interest generated favoritism for a single patent that the 1836 Patent Act sought to avoid.
Federalism and the Patent "Property" Right
Under the pre-classical system patents were treated as exclusive privileges granted in exchange for a promise to develop economic infrastructure. They were issued, supervised, and if need be revoked by the same legislative body. A good example is the state-issued steamboat 155 Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 553-554. 156 Id. patents previously discussed. 159 When patents are regarded as "property," however, their character changes. First, the issuance process becomes more regularized and removed from the political process. Second, the patent owner acquires greater discretion about whether and how the patent will be used. Third, as a property right the patent cannot be invoked at a legislature's behest, but only through judicial process.
Issues having to do with the management of property rights have traditionally been distinctively a part of state law, with federal law providing occasional limitations. Because patent property is created in the first instance by federal law, this division of power is more complex. Federal law determines the conditions for issuing a patent and its proper scope. Federal law also governs infringement actions, because these involve questions of validity and location of boundaries, two parts of the definition of the property right. Except for infringement actions, however, state law kicks in after a patent is issued and governs most issues of licensing, transfer and descent.
Increasingly after the Civil War the Supreme Court treated patents as a species of property, having many of the same constitutional protections as other forms of property. For example, it concluded in 1871 that "Inventions secured by letters patent are property in the owner of the patent, and as such are as much entitled to protection as any other property, consisting of a franchise, during the term for which the franchise or the exclusive right is granted." 160 In its 1888 Bell Telephone decision the Supreme Court confirmed that once a patent had been issued it could be revoked only by the courts and upon proof of improper issuance. The Court relied almost exclusively on the law of government grants of land titles, rejecting the patentee's objection that the Court's "reference[s] exclusively to patents for land ... are not applicable to patents for inventions and discoveries." 161 The court added:
The patent, then, is not the exercise of any prerogative power or discretion by the president, or by any other officer of the government, but it is the result of a course of proceeding quasijudicial in its character, and is not subject to be repealed or revoked by the president, the secretary of the interior, or the commissioner of patents, when once issued. The examination process recognized in the 1836 Patent Act and elaborated in the 1870 Act took concerns of economic development almost entirely out of the picture. None of the criteria explicitly linked patentability to socially productive innovation. While the Act required the Commissioner to ensure that the alleged invention was "useful,"
172 that requirement had largely become meaningless and, in any event, never referred to marketability or the filling of an important need, things that had been deemed essential to the issuance of early patents.
173
Chancellor Kent believed that patents had to be "to a certain degree beneficial to the community, and not injurious, or frivolous, or insignificant." 174 Justice Story, who generally favored broad monopoly grants, argued that the utility requirement should mean no more than that the invention must not be "frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society." 175 Judicial interpretation under the 1836 Act increasingly adopted the Story view.
176
Increasingly courts rejected inquiries into usefulness in patent validity litigation unless the only functions of the challenged device were immoral. 177 At the same time, applicants became entitled to a patent unless the examiner concluded that their patent application failed to meet one of the technical criteria for patentability. There was no applicant promise to deploy the patented 168 Id. independently, who could then practice the patent in competition with one another. Justice Story first observed that the federal Patent Act did not speak to the issue. 186 He then looked to the general common law and applied the ancient British rule in Mountjoy's Case, which had held that a license to take sod and gravel could not be subdivided among difference users unless the users committed to operate it jointly as "one stock," or effectively as a partnership.
187
No state statute addressed the issue either, and Justice Story did not say whether the presence of such a statute would have affected the outcome. Increasingly after the 1870s, however, the federal courts began to defer to state statutes regulating the assignment and licensing of patent rights, provided that the statutes did not interfere with the federal prerogative to secure the rights in the first place.
For example, the courts upheld state statutes extending the Statute of Frauds by requiring transfers of patents to be in writing and to authenticate or provide evidence of patent ownership. 188 The courts were more divided on state statutes that limited the negotiability of promissory notes used in purchase of patent rights unless the note clearly stated that the underlying consideration was a patent. 189 Some courts viewed these statutes as indicating that, while a patent was a form of property, it was somewhat less secure than tangible property rights. As a result a bona fide assignee of a promissory note had a right to know that the underlying interest was a patent rather than real or tangible personal property whose title was less likely to be disputed. As one Michigan decision striking down such a statute observed:
The plain and avowed purpose of the statute of 1871 is to impose conditions on the transfer of patent rights, which do not apply to any other kinds of property, thereby interfering with the value and enjoyment of such rights, and treating them as a species of interests to be regarded with disfavor. However, the court continued, questions concerning the validity of federal patent rights was for Congress and "that body alone" to determine.
191
In 1906 the Supreme Court confirmed the general division between federal and state law on questions of post-issuance commerce. Allen v. Riley upheld a state statute requiring copies of a patent and affidavits of genuineness to be attached to any commercial transfer of patent rights.
192 Justice Peckham's opinion for the Supreme Court distinguished a hypothetical state statute that prevented the transfers of federal patent rights, which would be in conflict with federal law, from the actual statute which did no more than police fraud. 193 "There is great opportunity for imposition and fraud in the transfer of intangible property, such as exists in a patent right, and many states have prescribed regulations for the transfer of such property differing essentially from those which control the transfer of other property."
194
Another area where the Patent Act left considerable room for state regulation concerned the immoral or unsafe uses of patented products or processes. As noted previously, 195 while the federal Patent Act assessed "usefulness" as a requirement for patent eligibility, the requirement was soon watered down to refer only to things that had no purpose other than illegality or immorality. Beyond that, the regulation of patented goods on grounds of safety or immorality largely befell the states. In the early leading decision in Vannini v. Paine the defendant had what is best described as a business method patent on a system for drawing lottery numbers. 196 The decision came down during the high tide of Jacksonian evangelical fervor against lotteries.
197
The Delaware legislature had already determined that lotteries are "pernicious and destructive to frugality and industry and introductive of idleness and immorality." As a result, the court held, it "cannot be admitted that the plaintiffs have a right to use an invention for drawing lotteries in this State, merely because they have a patent for it under the United States." 198 In its 1878
Patterson decision the Supreme Court held the defendant's patent on a particular fuel oil did not suffice to defend against a state statute that prohibited use of the oil because its burning 191 Ibid. Webber illustrated the rationale and limit for this power in the states:
The patent for a dynamite powder does not prevent the State from prescribing the conditions of its manufacture, storage, and sale, so as to protect the community from the danger of explosion. A patent for the manufacture and sale of a deadly poison does not lessen the right of the State to control its handling and use.
200
The Classical Patent in Decline: Federalism, the First Sale Doctrine, and the Invasion of Competition Law
Both federal and state law potentially reached post-issuance patent restraints that were thought to be anticompetitive. The Sherman Antitrust Act had been passed in 1890, but it made no mention of patents and played only a minor role in policing anticompetitive patent practices prior to the 1920's. The principal exception was the government antitrust prosecution of the Standard Sanitary cartel in 1912. The Court agreed that a market wide cartel in enameled ironware such as bathroom sinks could not defend by showing that the price fixing agreement was contained in a patent license covering the enameling process. 201 The first sale doctrine in patent law is entirely judge made, and its rationale has always been highly controversial. Some have argued that it was designed in furtherance of a policy about competition, 207 others that it represents an unjustified interference in freedom of contract, 208 and others that it was simply an exercise in statutory interpretation, which includes an assessment of the patent's appropriate domain. 209 But the doctrine was also used to divide the territory between federal patent law and competition law, whether federal or state. Nineteenth century courts often viewed the doctrine as policing the line between federal law, which governed patent issuance, and state law, which governed patent use as well as the use of patented products.
Writing in 1904 Albert Henry Walker, author of the most prominent of early twentieth century patent treatises, observed that:
The reason why the state may regulate the sale of the patented thing, and may not regulate the sale of the patent covering that thing, is explainable as follows: A patentee has two kinds of rights in his invention; he has a right to make, use, and sell specimens of the invented thing, and he has a right to prevent all other persons from doing either of those acts. The first of these rights is wholly independent of the patent laws, while the second exists by virtue of those laws alone. The patentee, therefore, holds the first of these rights subject to the police powers and the taxing powers of the state, and to the law regulating common carriers, while the second, being the creation of the laws of Congress, is wholly beyond state control or interference by antitrust laws or otherwise. 210 When the first sale doctrine applied, tying, exclusive dealing, resale price maintenance, and other patent licensing practices would not be preemptively approved as a matter of federal patent law. Rather, nonpatent statutory and common law would be left to control these practices. Then Sixth Circuit Judge Horace H. Lurton first exposed this problem in the Button-Fastener decision in 1896, which led to the Progressive critique that eventually federalized of the law of exclusive dealing and tying. The Button-Fastener defendant made a patented machine that fastened button hooks to garments. A license restriction required purchasers to use the patentee's 207 E.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and Competitive Harm: the First Sale Doctrine in
